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Current arguments concerning the role of normativity within the concept of 
mental disorder are explored, and some requirements of a successful normative 
construal sketched out. We then shift to a discussion of “natural” normativity in 
order to lay the groundwork for our own understanding of what counts as mental 
disorder. The view we present is grounded in an enactive, embodied, and embedded 
view of the mind (3e cognition). The position argued for is one where the labeling of 
a particular set of behaviors as disordered or dysfunctional is justified by the 
significant violation of norms, but where the norms in question are not socially 
imposed but are the functional norms of the individual being diagnosed. The 
strengths and weaknesses of our position are discussed, and an addendum proposed 
in response to a foreseeable counter-argument. This construal provides a conceptual 
framework for thinking critically about normative issues in diagnosis, appreciates 
how central normativity is to the concept of mental disorder, and finally (in being 
tied to the functionality of the individual), places the institutions of psychiatry and 
clinical psychology on good ethical ground and allows for consideration of cultural 









In the 1960’s and 70’s Thomas Szasz famously made the claim that mental 
disorder was a myth. Specifically, he claimed that the diagnoses of psychiatry were at 
best ‘problems in living’, at worst merely labels given to those that break the 
normative mold of society (Szasz, 1960, 1963, 1974). The assertion that mental illness 
is socially constructed strongly resonated with the anti-psychiatry movement, whose 
influence is still evident today (Lieberman & Ogas, 2015). Researchers and clinicians 
currently working in mental health arguably need to respond to such claims and 
understand the role of normativity in diagnosis and practice. The central questions 
are: what role if any should norms and values play in deciding what counts as mental 
disorder? what kinds of norms should play this role? and whose norms are of 
interest?  
At the outset we should specify that we are primarily concerned with what is 
normatively required for something to be considered a mental disorder, and largely 
set aside ontic and epistemological issues. Broadly, the current paper aims to first 
explore arguments concerning the role of normativity within the concept of mental 
disorder and to sketch out some requirements of a successful normative concept of 
mental disorder. Following the listing of these requirements we shift to a discussion 
of “natural” normativity and the deep continuity thesis of life and meaning. This is 
necessary in order to lay the ground work for our own understanding of what counts 
as mental disorder, which we will subsequently explicate. The view we present is 
grounded in an enactive, embodied, and embedded view of the mind (3e cognition)1. 
Within this article we do not seek to defend 3e Cognition, but rather seek to explore 
its implications within this area. The strengths and weaknesses of our position are 
                                                          
1 See in the 3e cognition section as to why we do not subscribe to extension/4e. 
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discussed, and an addendum proposed in response to a foreseeable counter-
argument. In the concluding section, we summarize and briefly explore the 
ramifications of our analysis for the development of a 3e conception of mental 
disorder, a larger project of which this article is part (Nielsen & Ward, 2018a, 2018b).  
To foreshadow our general conclusions, the position argued for is one where 
the labeling of a particular set of behaviors as disordered or dysfunctional is justified 
by the significant violation of norms, where the norms in question are not socially 
imposed but rather are the functional norms of the individual being diagnosed. 
Significance, in this context, is conceived of in reference to the degree to which the 
self-maintenance and adaption of the organism is threatened. These two concepts 
are borrowed directly from 3e Cognition. We will attempt to show how this construal 
provides a conceptual framework for thinking critically about normative issues in 
diagnosis, appreciates how central normativity is to the concept of mental disorder, 
and finally (in being tied to the functionality of the individual), places the institutions 
of psychiatry and clinical psychology on good ethical ground and allows for 
consideration of cultural and individual variation during the diagnostic process.  
Recent Views on the Role of Normativity 
There has been previous debate in the research literature about the role that 
values should play in diagnosis. Most generally this has been a two-sided argument 
in the form of ‘values in’ (evaluativist) versus ‘values out’ (descriptivist) positions.  
The former position arguing that the evaluative nature of a diagnosis is inescapable, 
while the latter proposes that diagnostic claims are purely factual in nature (Fulford, 
2002). The question of whether norms and values have a role to play at all is 
somewhat trivial; at its simplest, a diagnosis is a claim that something is wrong with 
a person. On our view it is therefore necessarily normative, and we therefore assume 
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an evaluativist position within this paper (others do disagree; see Hucklenbroich, 
2014). The more interesting question seems to be around what kinds of norms and 
values demarcate disorders from benign conditions, and how should they be 
employed to do so. Particularly contentious is the question of whether social and 
cultural norms should play a role (strong evaluativism) or not (weak evaluativism).  
In what follows, we sample some current and representative work in this area. 
There is a large and disparate literature that pertains to this issue and it is therefore 
not feasible to perform a complete review (for relevant readings see: Abouelleil & 
Bingham, 2014; Bolton, 2008; Browne, 2017; Fulford, 2001, 2002; Hucklenbroich, 
2014; Kendler, 2016; O'Connor, 2017; Porter, 2010; Sadler, 2005; Stein et al., 2010). 
Rather, in order to streamline our discussion in this section, we concentrate on an 
article by Stier (2013) and a selection of responses. We have chosen this formulation 
because it manages to capture the core issues at play in a succinct manner. Our aim 
is to draw out what is required of a framework attempting to conceptualize the role of 
normativity in demarcating mental disorder.  
Sample of Work in this Area   
Stier (2013) makes the claim that with the progression of neuroscience the 
medical model is gaining increasing traction within psychiatry. With the rise of a 
biologically based psychiatry Stier argues that we are disregarding the obviously 
normative nature of assessing human behavior and making diagnostic claims. On his 
view, on the basis of growing knowledge of the brain we mistakenly conclude that 
disorder itself is always reducible to a brain abnormality. Even if we assume that all 
behavior and experience stems from the brain (a counter-embodiment position he 
assumes within the context of his argument), the label of ‘disorder’ relies on 
assessment of the experience and behavior of the individual as pathological. Mental 
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disorder therefore, cannot be identified at a purely physiological level. According to 
Stier, there are many normative frames of reference against which psychiatry makes 
a diagnostic judgement: the personal values of the diagnostician, cultural 
expectations, generalizations about human nature, and the concepts of harm and 
disturbance. The examples he uses suggest a strong form of evaluativism (i.e. one 
inclusive of social and cultural norms). Stier goes on to explore some further 
normative concepts that play vital roles in psychiatry, but for the purposes of this 
discussion what we have covered here will suffice. Stier concludes that the prevalence 
of such normative factors within psychiatry as a practice supports his earlier 
argument that whether or not something is a mental disorder can only be determined 
on the mental (including behavioral) level.  
Responding to Stier’s (2014) claims, Muders (2014) raises two key criticisms. 
First, that Stier seems to be talking about the practice of psychiatry as it is done, 
rather than arguing for how it should be done. In doing so, he misses the possibility 
that while we currently rely on these normative frames of reference, this may actually 
be an error and thereby not suggestive of what the concept of mental disorder should 
be. Second, Muders suggests that Stier fails to unpack what it means for something 
to be normative. While the position we will eventually argue for is in line with Stier’s 
claim regarding the irreducibility of mental disorder to a brain state, Muders 
criticisms are valid. A framework circumscribing the role of normativity in the 
concept of mental disorder needs to be clear about what kind of norms are at issue 
and where they come from. It should also make a distinction between the concept as 
evident in the current process of diagnosis and the ‘ideal’ concept- how mental 
disorder should be thought of.  Regarding this last point, we wish to make it clear 
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that throughout this paper we are attempting to aim for the later; to develop a 
concept of what diagnosis should ideally represent within the normative domain.  
Jefferson (2014) also responds to Stier (2014). In the second half of her paper, 
she turns to the role that Stier describes normativity as having in the act of diagnosis, 
highlighting that his position is more than mere weak evaluativism. Rather, Stier’s 
assertion is that diagnostic claims in psychiatry are directly and pervasively 
influenced by moral, social, and cultural norms – a strong form of evaluativism –  
thereby introducing a large degree of relativity. Jefferson argues that this is 
problematic because it does not seem acceptable that what counts as disorder in one 
culture changes if somebody was uprooted to another culture with differing 
standards. While she accepts that some degree of vagueness is inescapable, Jefferson 
argues that we should strive for objectivity in diagnosis. She calls for “…a standard 
according to which we judge whether calling a certain condition pathological is valid 
or not.” (Jefferson, 2014, p. 2).  
While not directly responding to Stier (2014), Banner (2013) makes points 
relevant to the task at hand. She argues that mental disorders cannot be completely 
reduced to brain disorders on the basis that if a brain abnormality does not lead to a 
problem at the mental/behavioral level then it is not a mental pathology. Rather, the 
label ‘mental disorder’ indicates a problem at the level of the person functioning in 
their environment2. While some mental disorders have been found to correlate with 
abnormalities at a brain level, Banner correctly points out that it is the dysfunction at 
the level of the person that makes it pathological, not its (partial) instantiation in the 
brain. While the general thrust of Banner’s position is parallel to Stier’s claims 
                                                          
2 While not part of the sampled debate, Frisch (2014) makes very similar points based on an exploration of the 
ideas of Kurt Goldstein, one of the founders of clinical-neuropsychology. He demonstrates that Goldstein’s 
ideas were remarkably similar to what we express in this article.  
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around irreducibility, there are two elements of Banner’s construal that are 
particularly interesting. Firstly, she highlights the role of the social and 
environmental context in shaping what counts as disordered. Secondly, she defines 
mental disorder as specifically concerned with deviation from the individual’s 
functional norms; those norms that support the functioning of persons within their 
context3. 
What Can Be Learnt 
Out of this discussion, and most clearly implied by Muders (2014), two key 
requirements emerge: A normative concept of mental disorder must be clear about, 
1) what kind of norms are at issue, and 2) where they come from.  
Regarding the first requirement, it should be apparent that the most 
contentious question is whether or not socio-cultural norms have a role to play in 
demarcating mental disorders from benign conditions. Classically speaking, if they 
do then this would constitute a strong evaluativist position. If they do not, and the 
norms in question are simply those of the individual, then this would constitute a 
weak evaluativist position. However, we argue that this way of discriminating 
positions represents unduly dichotomous thinking. To explain this, we will first 
briefly summarize some of the positions of the papers explored above. 
Stier (2013) suggests that psychiatry is currently acting on an implicit strong 
evaluativism, but does not really comment as to whether or not this is justified. 
Jefferson (2014) in contrast, correctly points out that incorporating socio-cultural 
norms into the concept of diagnosis leaves us in an uncomfortably relativistic 
                                                          
3 Banner further divides these functional norms into separate domains within which they may fall, namely: 
epistemic, rational, emotional, moral, social, and those concerning self-knowledge. We don’t delve into these 
distinctions here but they are potentially quite useful.  
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position whereby disordered status may completely change with shifts in cultural 
contexts. This would position Jefferson as weakly evaluative. Banner (2013) however 
does something quite different. She emphasizes the functionality of the individual 
within their social and environmental context and defines mental disorder upon the 
breaking of the norms that support this functionality. At a first glance, this may seem 
to be a strongly evaluative position because, given that the socio-cultural 
environment plays a large role in deciding whether an action is functional or not, it 
leads to a situation where what counts as disordered changes with cultural and 
situational context4. On the basis of this, it appears that Banner’s position is strongly 
relativistic.  
However, on further inspection Banner’s (2013) position is a lot more 
nuanced than this, and indeed, more nuanced than she explicitly recognizes in her 
original paper. In being based on functional norms, her move allows only those 
socio-cultural norms that are crucial for the continued adaptive functioning of the 
individual within their context, while excluding those norms that merely serve the 
group or are merely statistical. While not explicitly stated, some socio-cultural norms 
are let in, and some are not, based on whether or not they contribute to functioning 
of the individual. This then begins to move beyond the classic dichotomy between 
weak and strong evaluativist positions. Further, this leaves the act of diagnosis as 
justifiable purely by reference to supporting the individual, thereby countering 
Szaszian type claims without ignoring the role of culture and context. When 
                                                          
4 And indeed it does seem to, for example, Fulford and Jackson (1997) describe three cases of people who 
exhibit psychotic phenomena, the experience of which actually helped them in times of crisis. They 
demonstrate how the only successful way of demarcating such benign cases from pathological psychosis is by 
reference to the values and beliefs of the individual – these being obviously culturally influenced factors. For 
further examples of culture’s pervasive influence on phenomena, often seen as indicative of psychopathology, 
see: Larøi et al. (2014), NiaNia, Bush, and Epston (2016). 
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explicating our own concept, we will therefore demarcate norms of relevance to 
mental disorder in a similar way.  
In this paper we aim to take a similar position, and to develop it into a 
coherent and more comprehensive conception of mental disorder. This will largely 
consist of situating the functional view within a broader framework of human 
functioning. There are multiple reasons for doing so. For one, it stems from the likely 
complex and multi-scale causal structure of mental disorders (Kendler, Zachar, & 
Craver, 2011). Situating conceptual work on mental disorder within an encompassing 
framework of human functioning will hopefully provide scaffolding for later 
integrative work. Furthermore, socio-cultural factors are not merely causally 
implicated in mental disorder, as is well known, but often play 
constitutional/definitional roles (Fulford, 1999; Fulford & Jackson, 1997; Larøi et al., 
2014; NiaNia et al., 2016). Integrating our understanding across these levels will 
therefore likely require a non-reductionistic and rich understanding of human 
functioning in general. One capable of valuing biological levels of explanation5 while 
simultaneously understanding culture and social embeddedness as more than an 
after-thought or as merely supervening on physiological processes (Kirmayer, 2006; 
Kirmayer & Crafa, 2014). We agree with Kirmayer and Ramstead (2017) that the 
concepts of embodiment and enactment have huge potential in this regard, and 
therefore, in line with our previous work, we will be using 3e cognition as such a 
framework (see; Nielsen & Ward, 2018a).  
Regarding the second requirement implied by Muders (2014) – that a concept 
of mental disorder be clear about what it takes its relevant norms to be – we will 
                                                          
5 By biological we here mean physiological, molecular etc. However, Frisch (2016) argues convincingly that 
‘biological psychiatry’ would be all the more biological with the inclusion of behavioural and environmental 
levels.  
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return to this issue in the next section when we discuss the origins of normativity, 
links to embodied enactivism, and unpack further the concept of a functional norm. 
For the current time however, we would point out that this requirement points to the 
need for any successful concept of mental disorder to be situated within a broader 
framework of human functioning, one that provides the beginnings of purpose to the 
human condition. This is because in order to say that there are better and worse ways 
for individuals to act and be (i.e., for there to be normativity regarding human 
functioning), we need to establish what ‘better’ and ‘worse’ could possibly mean in a 
world of facts (Hume, 1978). To parallel this point more simply, it seems prima facie 
true that labeling something as dysfunctional should require comparison to an idea 
of what it means to function correctly. As we will show in later sections, 3e cognition 
thinking can provide a means of doing this.  
Origins of Natural Normativity and Links to 3e Cognition 
We will now shift gears and start laying the ground-work for our own 
normative concept of mental disorder. We first overview two very similar systems of 
thought regarding the natural origins of normativity that come from outside of 3e 
cognition; this will offer more clarity of what we mean by the concept of a functional 
or natural norm. We then introduce the field of 3e cognition and connect this idea of 
natural normativity to core ideas from the 3e field. Finally, we argue that 3e thinking 
allows for an extension of these ideas and that two key concepts highlighted 
throughout these areas can be used to demarcate mental disorder from the benign – 
namely, self-maintenance and adaption.  
Functional/Natural Normativity 
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The ideas explored in this section have been developed by Wayne Christensen 
and Mark Okrent in separate works on the origins of normativity (Christensen, 2012; 
Christensen & Bickhard, 2002; Okrent, 2017). While these authors do not cite each 
other, they express remarkably similar ideas: that norms are inherent in self-
maintaining and adaptive systems such as life forms and arise in service to those 
systems continued adaptive functioning within their environment. More specifically, 
norms are seen as supporting the organizational autonomy6 of a system. 
Organizationally autonomous systems on Christenson’s view are those that 
“…possess a process organization that, in interaction with the environment, performs 
work to guide energy into the processes of the system itself.” (Christensen & 
Bickhard, 2002, p. 3). In other words, they are thermo-dynamically open but self-
maintaining systems7. To use the example of life forms, organisms are very much in a 
far-from-equilibrium state when contrasted with the wider environment within 
which they are embedded; it’s very easy for life forms to die, but hard for them to 
keep living. The persistence of an organism relies on a set of balanced conducive 
states and processes (self-maintenance), but also that these states and processes 
change in response to alterations in the environment in a way that serves self-
maintenance (adaption). These states and processes occur both within the individual 
(e.g. blood pressure and circulation), and within the environment (e.g. sufficient 
oxygen). These states and processes are the functional norms of the organism. 
Importantly for our purposes, behaviors of the whole system, so long as they serve 
the continued function of the organism, can also be seen as functional norms (e.g. 
                                                          
6 We have added the descriptor ‘organisational’ to differentiate it from personal autonomy, a related but 
separate concept. For clarity we have, throughout this article, tended to refer to ‘self-maintenance and/or 
adaption’ so as not to introduce confusion with personal autonomy – valuation of which varies across cultures.  
7 The connection to 3e thinking is clear here, e.g. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (2017), but links can also be 
made to Free Energy Principle theory; see Kirchhoff (2016). 
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seeking food and shelter); “…for an entity to be alive is in part for it to interact with 
its surroundings in ways that are instrumental to its continuing life, given the kind of 
thing it is, from the ‘standpoint’ of the living thing there is a right and a wrong way to 
carry out that interaction.” (Okrent, 2017, p. 28). These accounts view “… normativity 
as inherent in the organization or form of living systems…” (Christensen, 2012, p. 
104). This is why functional norms are often called natural norms.  
The largest point of demarcation between these two authors is that 
Christensen is oriented to a systems perspective, and Okrent to one of organisms and 
agents. Both view norms as arising from the teleological purposiveness of self-
maintenance and adaptivity. For Okrent this is grounded in the nature of being an 
organism, and whether other kinds of things can give rise to such norms is an open 
question8. Christensen is not bound to organisms as the only known sources of 
normativity in this way. Christensen’s view makes it more explicit that ecosystems, 
social institutions, and other autonomous systems may conceivably have their own 
non-derivative functional norms (Christensen, 2012; Christensen & Bickhard, 2002). 
For example, these norms might relate to levels of predation in an ecosystem, or 
availability of coffee in a busy office. 
This overview hopefully elucidates what we mean by functional/natural 
norms. To further clarify however, we will briefly cover two types of norms that do 
not count as functional norms. Firstly, a functional norm is very different to norms 
based on typicality. Norms based on typicality are those that aren’t functionally 
important and are simply based on deviation from the usual distribution – e.g. 
having a non-problematic benign growth or having purple hair; neither is typical, but 
                                                          
8 Okrent does note that “Whether or not it is also the case that norms only arise in the context of life remains 
to be seen.” (Okrent, 2017, p.28). 
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neither is either a problem. These are often referred to as ‘statistical’ norms, and they 
are not seen as prescriptive (Okrent, 2017). As such, statistical norms cannot be of 
direct use for defining dysfunction or disorder, a point implicitly supported by 
Banner’s (2013) construal and noted by Jefferson (2014) in the discussion earlier; “A 
statistical notion of dysfunction and pathology is too thin to be useful for medical 
practice.” (Jefferson, 2014, p. 2). 
Secondly, it is quite common in the literature to see norms of human 
functioning as derived from a component’s apparent evolutionary function (Troisi & 
McGuire, 2002; Wakefield, 1992). Norms based on purported evolutionary function 
are much more similar to the account at hand than statistical norms, in that they are 
prescriptive rather than merely statistical in nature. However, construing norms as 
natural based on their apparent evolutionary function faces a knowledge problem: 
we cannot know for certain that we have the evolutionary story correct, nor that 
other unknown functions aren’t being simultaneously served by the state or process 
in question (Christensen & Bickhard, 2002). Furthermore, such an account does not 
leave room for adaptive deviations from the evolutionary norm (Christensen & 
Bickhard, 2002; Troisi & McGuire, 2002). This is hugely problematic given the 
importance of adaptive phenotypic variation for evolutionary theory. As such, we do 
not see evolutionary theory as providing a rich enough account of human functioning 
to support an understanding of disorder, at least within the mental realm (however, 
for a good attempt at such a construal, see Troisi & McGuire, 2002). 
As a fictional example to flesh these differentiations between functional, 
statistical, and evolutionary norms we use the example of Jim. Jim has three arms, 
his third arm sits underneath his right. Importantly, Jim’s third arm does not get in 
the way of his functioning, in fact Jim is better at many tasks than plain old two-
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armed people. Jim’s arm therefore breaks norms of typicality (most people don’t 
have three arms), and etiological/evolutionarily derived norms (we did not evolve to 
incorporate a third arm). However, Jim’s third arm does not break the functional 
norms of ‘Jim the complex autonomous system’ because it does not get in the way of 
Jim’s ability to meet his needs relevant to self-maintenance, nor impact his ability to 
adapt to environmental changes. On our view then, Jim should not be seen as 
disordered. 
As a point of clarification, we are not saying here that the existence of 
functional norms cannot sometimes be inferred from statistical comparisons across 
individuals. Taking the example of blood pressure: we know what sorts of parameters 
are medically acceptable based on research studies, and that certain blood pressure 
thresholds are associated with harmful outcomes such as fainting, heart attacks, 
strokes, etc. This sort of inference seems reasonable, at least at the physiological 
scale where the states and processes that constitute functional norms are somewhat 
more stable across individuals, and deviations from norms often have more obvious 
effects (e.g. blood pressure is clearly definable and measurable, similar levels count 
as too high or too low across individuals, and deviation from the norm can result in 
outcomes that immediately challenge the self-maintenance of the individual). The 
inference from typicality and associated risk across the population to a normative 
claim about an individual’s blood pressure therefore seems reasonable. For reasons 
we will return to later, whether the same sort of inference can be made when 
considering behaviors of an organism that do not seem to directly serve some 
obvious biological norm remains to be seen. We will argue that they cannot. Before 
doing so, we must first consider if views such as those of Christensen and Bickhard 
(2002), and Okrent (2017), can be extended to inform an understanding of the 
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normativity of complex human behavior. We believe they can, and that the tools to 
do so are found within the field of 3e cognition, which we will now describe.  
Overview of 3e Cognition 
 In this section we aim to describe the 3e Cognition perspective rather than 
argue for it. Our interest is in the implications of this approach for our understanding 
of psychopathology, rather than the philosophical justification for it (key literature 
supporting the 3e view is referenced at the end of this section).  
 By 3e Cognition we refer to the view that the mind is fully material, and that it 
is constituted by not just the brain, but the brain-body system; we are embodied 
beings. More than this, interactions with the physical and social environments within 
which the organism is embedded are seen as necessary conditions for the 
development of the mind over time; we are embedded. We are also enactive 
creatures (Gallagher, 2017; Thompson, 2007). According to enactivism, the mind is 
not a thing above and beyond the organism in the Cartesian sense. Rather it is an 
interrelated set of capacities that are essentially dispositions to act in accordance 
with an organism’s needs, interests, and respective goals (note that these would 
count as functional norms as described above). Mental processes are necessarily 
embodied in the brain, nervous system, and all other biological systems of the body. 
Phenomenological experience emerges (is enacted) by virtue of the organism making 
sense of and adapting to the world (Di Paolo, 2005); it is the body experiencing itself 
and the world (Fuchs, 2017). The enactive/embodied conception of human 
functioning is based on a relatively simple idea: human psychological functioning 
and sense of meaning is shaped in fundamental ways by bodily experience and the 
needs of the body as a biological organism within its environment (Gallagher, 2006; 
Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 2017). It is not possible for minds to function 
 17 
independently of the body (Thompson & Cosmelli, 2011); they are essentially 
interrelated sets of processes. 
Thus the mind can be seen, not as a linear symbol processing machine with a 
defined inputs and outputs, but as an emergent property of the whole organism 
arising from interactions in the brain-body-environment system to better serve its 
self-maintenance and adaption (Thompson, 2007). Human cognition then is much 
less dependent on cognitive representation and processing: “a natural cognitive 
agent – an organism, animal or person – does not process information in a context-
independent sense. Rather it brings forth or enacts meaning in structural coupling 
with its environment.” (Thompson, 2007, p. 58). This also has the effect that, from 
the perspective of 3e Cognition, the affective nature of our experience – the meaning 
that is immediately apparent in the world around us or what Maiese (2016) calls 
affective framing – can be seen as real (Colombetti, 2014; Colombetti & Thompson, 
2008). We have here simply offered an outline of 3e Cognition, for a defense of the 
3e viewpoint see: Colombetti, (2014); Durt, Fuchs, and Tewes, (2017); Fuchs, (2017); 
Gallagher, (2017); Gibbs, (2005); Maiese, (2016); Thompson,( 2007); Hutto and 
Myin (2012, 2017) and Varela et al., (2017). 
Readers familiar with these ideas will note that we are using the term 3e, 
when often the term 4e is used. We do so because we do not subscribe to the fourth 
‘e’ - extension (where the mind is seen as partially constituted by the external 
environment; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Our reasons for this are multiple but we will 
briefly allude to them. Firstly, we do not see full extension as compatible with 
enactivism and embodiment given that the latter two emphasize the process of 
continual separation between organism and environment (self-maintenance), while 
extension de-emphasizes this (Maiese, 2017). Secondly, enactivism holds that 
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meaning is always relational – it is generated by an organism through its needful 
relation with the world (Thompson, 2007). The constitutional boundaries of the 
organism become blurry and ever-changing under extension (Maiese, 2017), and this 
seems to make the nature of the enactive relation very unclear. Thirdly, for our 
purposes at least, subscription to embeddedness (rich and necessary causal relations 
between organism and environment), as opposed to extension (constitutional 
expansion), can achieve much of the same conceptual ends while allowing for clearer 
explanations, e.g. it would be very hard to explain the depression of some client 
‘John’ if we spend our time trying to decide where ‘John’ ended and his environment 
began. Fourthly, many brands of extension seem to rely on an information-
processing account that we disagree with due to their running afoul of the hard 
problem of content (for more on this see: Harvey, 2015; Hutto & Myin, 2012). 
Finally, Thompson and Stapleton (2009) show that once the concept of extension is 
cut to size in-order to fit with embodied enactivism then genuine extension of the 
mind becomes a much less remarkable and quite rare phenomenon.  
The Deep Continuity Thesis, Cultural Embedment, and Normativity 
The idea of naturally derived normativity explored earlier in this section is 
remarkably similar to a key set of concepts in 3e Cognition. In particular, there is 
great similarity here to the deep continuity thesis (DCT). This is the idea that that the 
origins of mind arise from the same process structures that support and define life 
(Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Thompson, 2007). Under the DCT, meaning arises from 
an organism’s needful relation with its environment; to self-maintain requires the 
acquisition of energy from the world and avoidance of threats to the self (Thompson, 
2007). At the cellular level this process is referred to as autopoiesis (Thompson, 
2011; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). This needs-based relationship changes the 
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environment to one of meaning and valence for the organism, making the mind and 
our relation to the world inescapably affective in nature9, whilst still thoroughly 
embodied (Colombetti, 2014; Colombetti & Thompson, 2008; Maiese, 2016). This 
does not mean that basic life forms, or plants, are conscious in a self-aware or 
reflective sense (this would be seen to come later, with the evolutionary development 
of a nervous system or some equivalent).  Rather, according to the DCT, all life forms 
are viewed as having a non-conscious subjectivity or ‘zero-point’, and a non-
conscious embodied ‘concern’ (i.e. a self-perpetuating structure) for the continuation 
of the self (self-maintenance) in the face of changing and precarious environmental 
conditions (adaption) (Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Thompson & Stapleton, 
2009). Insofar as an organism should act to maintain its own life, there are states, 
actions, and processes that the organism should be in or perform. These states, 
actions, and processes change in accordance with the current needs of the organism 
and the constraint of the environment. Consistent with Christensen and Okrent’s 
work, the DCT places the origins of normativity and meaning in the self-maintenance 
of organizationally autonomous and adaptive complex systems – namely, life forms 
(Christensen, 2012; Christensen & Bickhard, 2002; Okrent, 2017).  
3e thinking however, offers an extension of this account of normativity. Two 
key 3e concepts are important here. Firstly, that of embedment described earlier, 
where interactions with the environment are necessary for the development of the 
mind. This refers to both a physical and, especially in humans, a socio-cultural 
environment. The second key idea relevant to our purposes here is the constitutional 
view of culture (CVC). Most succinctly espoused in the introduction of Durt et al. 
                                                          
9 It is fascinating to note that Okrent (2017) also arguably touches on this point. In chapter 2 he states, “for an 
organism to perceive its world is to perceive what is instrumentally important to the organism…” (p.31). Thus, 
he ties perception to the enaction of meaning via the pragmatic needs of a living organism, in a very similar 
way to the 3e authors cited here.  
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(2017), CVC is in many ways an elaboration of embedment. According to the CVC, 
groups of individuals and the artifacts they produce constitute a cultural ontology; a 
collaboratively generated shared world of significance and meaning that facilitates 
intra-group behavior and the transmission of tools, knowledge, and ways of knowing 
(Durt et al., 2017; Kirmayer & Ramstead, 2017). This shared world, or habitus (in the 
sociological sense), is embodied within the habits and practices of the group which 
are passed on to and developed by younger generations because they represent 
adaptive ways of understanding, managing, and altering the environment (Henrich, 
2015; Heyes, 2018). Interestingly, such a perspective can even be shown to 
encompass so-called higher level cognitive practices such as mathematics and 
reasoning about the minds of others (Gallagher, 2017; Heyes, 2018). Significantly, 
this shared world, while being co-generated by the group, also represents a major 
reshaping of the environment within which individuals reside, thereby constructing 
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of individuals in ways that the group 
has found to be adaptive (Durt et al., 2017).   
These two ideas in combination have allowed authors such as Maiese (2016) 
and Di Paolo (2005) to describe how, in conceptually and socially sophisticated 
animals such as ourselves, more complex tendencies in behavior can develop, 
embodied within the dynamics of the organism system. Building upward from the 
enactive core of meaning rooted in the needful relation between organism and 
environment, Maiese and Di Paolo demonstrate how irreducible higher-order socio-
culturally mediated values can emerge. Over evolutionary and life-span time scales, 
these behavioral/valuation-al tendencies are selected for and developed, as they 
allow the organism to flourish in accordance with the constraints of the socio-
cultural environment (which they as a group constitute and as individuals reside 
within). These behaviors are therefore irreducible functional norms, serving the 
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flourishing and by extension the self-maintenance and adaption of the organism 
system within the socio-cultural environment. As individuals and cultures then, 
humans generate their own values/meaning. Within our framework, we have labelled 
these interpersonal prudential norms10; examples may include mastery, personal 
autonomy, and social connectedness (Nielsen & Ward, 2018a). Functional norms 
then, as used within our framework, are not simply inherent in those biological 
states, processes, and basic behaviors of the organism that immediately support 
them (e.g. seeking food and shelter), but are also evident in more complex behaviors 
that indirectly serve the continued functioning and maintenance of the organism via 
reciprocal relations with the socio-cultural environment. Maiese (2016) offers the 
example of being a good driver: we wish to be good drivers not simply so that we can 
avoid crashing, but to demonstrate our mastery which has positive social 
implications for us. 
While biological norms are similar across individuals, interpersonal 
prudential norms vary in the degree to which they are endorsed across cultures. This 
is because culture constitutes a significant variation in the environment, thereby 
placing differing constraints on how individuals can best achieve their needs. 
Endorsement will also vary across individuals due to dispositional differences 
(whether learnt or genetic). This has implications for the process by which we can 
gain knowledge of norms. As discussed earlier regarding the norms of bodily 
processes such as blood pressure, the inference from typicality and associated risk at 
a population level to a normative claim about an individual seems reasonable. 
However, things get murkier when we shift to functional norms of behavior. For 
example, the degree of personal autonomy required to support functioning will vary 
                                                          
10 In our previous paper we referred to these as values rather than norms, we have shifted to the use of norms 
for the sake of clarity (Nielsen & Ward, 2018a).  
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across contexts, cultures, and individuals. The inference from typicality to functional 
norm is a lot more tenuous within the domain of behavior than it is when considering 
physiology or the like (Fulford, 2002). This is because there are many different ways 
for individuals, groups, cultures, societies, and ecosystems to meet the needs 
required for their self-maintenance. In other words, these higher-level systems have 
a larger set of functional states. In contrast, the human circulatory system and other 
such internal bodily systems, have a much smaller set of functional states – e.g. not 
much needs to change about the circulatory system to result in the death of an 
organism. In practice, this means that a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist will 
always be asking the question “is this a problem for this individual within their 
context?” Whereas, for a medical doctor, answers to this question will be easier to 
arrive at. 
What Counts as Mental Disorder? 
Drawing together this ground-work and weaving it in with the previous 
discussion on normativity in the concept of mental disorder, a view emerges similar 
to but more developed than that argued for by Banner (2013) (also see Frisch, 2016). 
What counts as mentally dysfunctional is any set of behaviors (inclusive of cognition, 
perception – anything the organism does) performed by an organism that 
significantly violates its own functional norms, in that it is acting counter to its own 
self-maintenance and adaption needs11. The persistence of this pattern of behavior 
                                                          
11 We use these two processes within this definition because, under a 3e conception of human functioning 
these are fundamental processes. Other values/functional norms should be considered when demarcating 
dysfunction, such as the interpersonal prudential norms mentioned earlier. However, we believe that a 
reasonable link needs to be made back to these fundamental processes if a diagnostic label is going to be 
ethically applied. To not demonstrate such a link risks pathologizing individual or cultural variances in modes of 
functioning.  
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thereby threatens the organism’s organizational autonomy and as such, should be 
considered disordered12. 
This is similar to Banner’s construal in that it is functionally defined, thereby 
positioning it beyond the false dichotomy of weak versus strong evaluativism. As 
argued earlier, this is a significant strength as the act of diagnosis is then justifiable 
by reference to individuals and their needs; staving off Szaszian claims (unlike strong 
evaluativism), while also not ignoring how culture shapes many of those needs in the 
first place (as per weak evaluativism). However, being situated within the broader 
framework of 3e cognition offers advantages over Banner’s functionalism. This 
framework brings greater conceptual specificity, provides justification for the use of 
functionality as the crux of the definition, encourages ecological considerations 
including socio/cultural elements, and offers a rich and coherent system for 
conceptualizing relevant factors such as mind and culture. We will now continue to 
develop this construal, first by highlighting some key strengths, and then by 
exploring a foreseeable counter-argument to which we reply. 
Evaluating this Position 
We think that a strength of this framework is that it is in many ways 
congruent with a medical understanding of physical illness, while also highlighting 
the differences between the bio-medical and psychological domains and their 
respective conceptual needs.  A significant violation of the functional norms of an 
organism system at a biological scale essentially constitutes an injury or medical 
condition. Similarly, on our view a significant and continued violation of functional 
norms of the organism system at a behavioral or psychological scale is a 
                                                          
12 Note here that we draw a distinction between ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘disordered’, with disordered referring to 
the persistence of significantly dysfunctional behaviour.  
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psychological disorder. As explored above, one key difference between these domains 
is that in the former it is generally safer to infer the existence of a functional norm 
from a statistical one. Functionality of behavior and psychology is, in contrast, 
diverse in that there are many ways to be functional – as exampled by cultural 
variation (Fulford, 2002). It is therefore ethically questionable to infer that a norm 
derived from typicality is a functional one within the psychological domain, because 
whether it counts as a functional norm is going to be much more individually and 
contextually specific. This framework therefore prescribes great attention to the role 
of the context in shaping an individual’s way of functioning. 
At all scales of analysis, the 3e framework highlights that an organism is 
attempting to act in accordance with its inherent purpose – to adapt (Di Paolo, 
2005) and self-maintain (Thompson, 2007). Just as getting a cold reflects faltering of 
the immune system to adapt to the challenge of a pathogen, mental or behavioral 
disorders often reflects a faltering of the organism attempting to adapt to the 
challenge of a changing environment13. ‘Faltering’ is here used because outright 
failure is inappropriate; the organism is still alive. An example of this would be a 
child growing up in a difficult family context where cycles of coercion have negatively 
reinforced his escalating of aggressive behavior (Granic & Patterson, 2006; Smith et 
al., 2014). We know this will not serve the child well in other contexts, and may 
disrupt other norms of development (Erskine et al., 2016). However, the aggression 
has developed due to the constraints of the family system and the child’s adaption to 
this environment. A further example would be a refugee from a war zone whose 
previously adaptive bias towards interpreting others’ actions as aggressive is now 
                                                          
13 We realise this is not a perfect analogy – many symptoms of a cold may actually be seen as a functional and 
typical response to the presence of the pathogen. 
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dysfunctional within his present, largely peaceful, context. Both examples highlight 
the need for consideration of context over time rather than just the role of the 
current environment. The 3e perspective allows for, and indeed encourages, 
recognition of both of these sides; that this behavioral pattern is an adaption to the 
environment, but that it is also very likely to be maladaptive in other contexts and is 
maintaining a family dynamic that is problematic for both other family members and 
the continuing development of the child. Our framework then, encourages the 
consideration of context. The question being: in what way is the behavior attempting 
to serve the person’s needs within their context (past or present), and are there other 
ways for these needs to be met that would represent a more balanced normative 
equation? 
This brings us to what we see as a further strength of thinking about disorder 
in this way. An individual’s functional norms do not necessarily all point to a single 
prescribed action (and if they do, these tend to be areas in our lives in which 
decisions as to which action to take are clear and easy). Instead, functional norms 
often compete, and compromise is required. For example, it’s ideal to sleep 6-8 hours 
a night, but sometimes we have some approaching deadline and need to compromise 
on this; staying up late to finish some important project. One can act in accordance 
with one norm, while violating another.  When it comes to norms, compromise is the 
norm! If however, I stay up late to complete work regularly, perhaps for less and less 
important projects and resulting in chronic tiredness, then the normative equation 
begins to look unbalanced. In other words, this pattern of behavior starts to look 
dysfunctional. 
This idea of an unbalanced normative equation is worth fleshing out with a 
clinical example. Imagine a client where some behavior (e.g., cutting) is serving some 
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function (e.g., emotional regulation). To use normative language, the cutting is 
serving the norm of emotional stability. However, in the process, other norms are 
adversely impacted (e.g., having unbroken skin). Two elements are of importance 
here. Firstly, while the cutting is serving a norm/function, this does not mean that it 
is on the whole ‘functional’. Other norms are being violated by this action (having 
unbroken skin), and there is risk of breaking even more vital norms (e.g., being 
infection free, undamaged arteries/veins). It is this element that is important when 
considering whether the equation is reasonably balanced or not; whether the pattern 
of behavior and its consequences are on the whole functional (ranging from ideal to 
roughly functional) or dysfunctional (the individual’s functional norms are being or 
are at significant risk of being significantly impacted). The second element to 
consider in this example is whether there are clearly ways in which the function 
performed by the cutting behavior may be achieved in a significantly less normatively 
imbalanced way (e.g., emotional regulation strategies). Insofar as there is a less 
negatively impactful way to achieve some norm, and that the compromising of other 
collateral norms is significant, we are justified in offering assistance. When the 
functional norm breaking behavior takes a recognized causal and constitutional 
form, labeling with a diagnosis to facilitate communication and treatment across 
organizations is our society’s way of achieving and providing this assistance.   
A Possible Objection  
Many readers at this point will be concerned that we have ignored an obvious 
counter example. This would be a situation where the social context is placing 
unjustified constraints on someone, and where defiance of these constraints appears 
somewhat ‘dysfunctional’. Examples would include acts of rebellion in a totalitarian 
society, and gay people expressing their sexuality in a homophobic society. At first 
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glance it may seem that according to our view these are instances of mental disorder 
because both acts are not adaptive within the social context given the risk they bring 
to the individual. This is obviously a problematic conclusion. This issue seems to 
underlie the intuitive need for some sort of recognized dysfunction or lesion 
alongside the normatively defined ‘harm’, as in the harmful dysfunction analysis 
(Wakefield, 1992, 1997). The intuition seems to be that this requirement allows for 
an easy response to such counter examples; the ontic distinction from typicality at 
some sub-personal level makes the disorder seem more ‘real’. However, we will argue 
that, with an addendum justified by the broader 3e framework, our functional 
construal can exclude such cases. It is therefore more parsimonious than two-part 
models, and does not unduly privilege the sub-personal. First however we must 
explore the issue in a little more depth.  
In general terms the violation of norms of the socio-cultural systems 
(functional, legal, civil, or otherwise), do not represent mental disorder under our 
framework (they may however represent a crime, immoral act, or social faux pas). 
Rather we are specifically concerned with the functional norms of the individual. 
This is what separates our claim regarding the normativity of mental disorder from 
the Szaszian view, under which disorders are defined by the violation of socio-
cultural norms (and are therefore not justifiable if the labeling of disorder is truly 
intended to be in the interest of the individual; Szasz, 1960, 1963, 1974).  
Unfortunately, things are rarely this simple. Under the CVC, one may note 
that there is a complex two-way relationship between the norms of an individual and 
the norms of a culture or society. While the norms of the culture serve the continued 
survival and functioning of the collective, the collective itself is of course constituted 
by the individuals and therefore the functional norms of the culture will, largely and 
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for the most part, serve the majority of the individuals’ survival. Going in the other 
direction, the norms of the group are a dominant constraint on how the developing 
individuals within that group context learn to function. Large parts of the intra-
dependent set of functional norms operating on an individual are therefore shaped 
by their cultural context across development. Someone who grew up in urban Japan 
will have a different way of functioning than someone who grew up in bible-belt USA, 
and so on. If culture is the ways of knowing, being in, functioning, and making sense 
of the world, shared across a particular group (Durt et al., 2017), then consideration 
of culture when asking normative questions is always going to be relevant.  
This means that a discussion of individual normativity must explore the role 
of culture but, more practically, also makes teasing apart the functional norms of an 
individual from the norms of the culture in which they reside challenging. This is 
especially true when someone is part of a cultural minority or of a culture that is less 
recognized in the mainstream, as such individuals are effectively living between two 
worlds and exposed to contrasting ways of functioning. One particularly interesting 
example, that highlights the importance of interplay of individuals and culture in 
shaping the functionality or disorder of a behavior, is how experiences that from a 
western viewpoint would certainly be classified as hallucinations are interpreted 
much less pathologically in many cultures. For individuals embedded within such 
cultures, the consequences for their functioning are much less severe, sometimes 
even positive (Fulford & Jackson, 1997; Larøi et al., 2014; NiaNia et al., 2016).  
 This gets us to the problem. In recognizing that social context is a huge part of 
the individual’s environment, socio-cultural norms can sometimes be imported as 
derivatively functional for the individual. It therefore seems that such cases as 
rebellion in totalitarian society, or expression of queer sexuality in a homophobic 
 29 
society, must be counted as disordered under a functional construal. However, the 3e 
orientation of our framework can help us in navigating this situation. 3e thinking 
places the anchor point of consideration at the level of the individual; as the 
experiencing agent, for which meaning exists. In light of this, it seems very odd to 
refer to a norm as functional for an individual if it stems from a socio-cultural norm 
that does no work for, or in fact is running counter to, the self-maintenance and 
adaption of the individual in question. We therefore suggest the following addendum 
that helps clarify why such examples do not count as disorder under our framework: 
A norm, even if apparently functional, should not be used to define disorder 
if it is derived from (secondary to) either: 
a) A non-functional norm of a higher-order system, or 
b) A functional yet arbitrary norm of a higher-order system that is 
impinging on the self-maintenance and/or adaption of the lower 
order entity.  
We will now explain and justify this addendum through the exploration of the 
problematic cases. Firstly, the expression of homosexual orientation in a 
homophobic society. As explored above, an argument could be made that this not 
functional for the individual because it risks persecution. However, the socio-cultural 
norm of homophobia is a statistical/religious/erroneous moral norm, not a 
functional one. We now know that allowing honest expression of sexuality with our 
societies does not result in societal collapse. Therefore, the constraint placed on the 
individual by the homophobic norm is not justified; the problem is with society and 
with its norms not working for the individual, not with the individual themselves14. 
                                                          
14 As a parallel point it is also very difficult to see within this example how a norm that is so constraining on the 
autonomy of the individual can really be said to be ‘functional’ for that individual.  
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Accordingly, the addendum above specifies that while it may, in a homophobic 
context, be somewhat functional to hide one’s sexuality, continued expressions 
against this particular functional norm should not be seen to constitute mental 
disorder. This is because the dysfunctionality of honest expression of one’s sexuality 
is derived from a non-functional socio-cultural norm. Insofar as, from a CVC view, it 
is society’s role to serve its constituents, the dysfunction is with the homophobic 
society, not with the homosexual individual.  
Secondly, concerning rebellion and other risky political acts. Once again, an 
argument can be made for such behaviors being dysfunctional because they risk the 
self-maintenance and/or adaption of the individual. This is a slightly more 
complicated situation because, despite moral qualms, it may be argued that the 
overly restrictive norms of a totalitarian society are functional in that they are 
helping to maintain the stability of the society in question15. However, there is a sense 
in which the functionality of such norms is arbitrary; we know that other societies 
exist that do not rely on totalitarian norms for their continuation. Assuming again 
that the purpose of a society is to serve its constituents (as per the CVC), the fact that 
this society is impinging on its member’s self-maintenance and/or adaption to 
survive suggests that the dysfunction is at a societal level, not with the rebellious 
individual (and indeed this seems to go some way in justifying their action for 
change). In accordance with this reasoning, the above addendum rules out basing the 
labeling of mental disorder on seemingly functional norms derived from functional 
yet arbitrary socio-cultural norms.  
                                                          
15 Once again, it is difficult to see how such overly restrictive norms are in any true sense ‘functional’ for the 
individuals being constrained. However, given the context it becomes in a sense ‘functional’ to abide by it.  
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Having questioned societal norms in light of individual norms, it is interesting 
to question individual norms in light of the social16. There are certainly cases where 
the social trumps the individual17. Even when some action is functional for the 
individual, should it cross certain social norms then this would seem to constitute a 
social faux pas, crime, or immoral act. The framework presented here does not 
excuse such actions (although we would hope it would encourage compassion in 
seeking to explain them). In cases where patterns of such action become a learned 
way of functioning for an individual though, two interesting categories seem to 
emerge. The simplest of these is non-pathological; those that achieve their own self-
maintenance and adaption in disregard of social/legal/moral norms. This category 
would range from selfish people to career criminals. The second case is more 
interesting for our discussion here; those whose patterns of social norm violations 
actually work against their own self-maintenance and adaption within their social 
environment, and are therefore pathological in the sense defined here – i.e. 
personality disorders. Under our framework personality disorders do seem to count 
as disorder, but the harm to the individual is mediated by the breaking of social 
norms rather than by the crossing of individual norms directly. These constructs 
then are different in kind to both “regular” psychopathology where individual 
                                                          
16 Thank you to one of the reviewers for suggesting this dialectical approach.  
17 When an individual acts in the interest of the group, in contradiction to their own interests, then there may 
be a concern that our framework labels such a behavior dysfunctional, and its persistence disordered – some 
sort of ‘altruistic personality disorder’ if you will. This is an issue that needs further thought, but our intuition is 
that our framework is not individualistically biased in this way. Within the timeframe of the act, altruistic 
behaviors seem to reflect an emphasis on individual and biologically immediate norms relative to socio-
culturally generated norms. However, because these norms benefit the individual at other times, then as per 
to our addendum, these altruistic norms should not be used to define disfunction. Thus, someone may, to a 
certain degree, act against their own self-maintenance and adaption in a non-dysfunctional way. The limiting 
factor is that, largely and for the most part, the norms they are following during the act benefit them at other 
times.   
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functional norms are directly impinged, and social deviancy where social norms are 
directly violated. 
Before closing this section, it is worthwhile to briefly consider some current 
personality disorders as they represent complex normative cases. On the current 
construal some personality disorders end up looking more valid than others. For 
example, it is hard to imagine a group that functions well and serves the interest of 
the constituent members where interpersonal styles akin to those seen in narcissistic 
personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, or anti-social personality 
disorder are encouraged. The socio-cultural norms in question then, seem both 
functional and non-arbitrary, with the outcome being problematic interpersonal 
functioning (although in the case of narcissism there would be a genuine argument to 
be made that the problems that arise primarily concern others rather than the 
individual being diagnosed). In other cases, however, such as in schizotypal 
personality disorder, the socio-cultural norms being broken seem very much to be 
predominantly statistical, making this a very questionable diagnostic category under 
the current framework. Finally, schizoid personality is very interesting to consider – 
while statistical norms are certainly being broken in such cases, it is hard to 
understand how this disorder represents a functional problem for the individual 
concerned. This ‘disorder’ therefore seems more likely to be simply a different mode 
of functioning. 
Conclusions and Summary 
We have argued elsewhere that, ontologically speaking, all forms of 
psychopathology are likely constitutionally and causally complex phenomena, 
situated across multiple scales of analysis. Despite their complexity they are the sorts 
of ‘natural’ things we can seek to explain, and when they occur with some reliability 
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they seem like good candidates for being natural kinds of a type-causal variety 
(Nielsen & Ward, 2018a). 
Ultimately though, a diagnosis is a claim that something is wrong with a 
person’s functioning. A diagnosis is therefore a normative claim. Overviewing a brief 
sample of literature in this area, the most pertinent question seemed to be: which 
norms are relevant when demarcating disordered from benign conditions? Stier 
(2013) described current practice as including socio-cultural norms within this 
distinction, while Jefferson (2014) suggested this is unjustified and risks 
unsustainable relativism. We suggested that the most viable move was exemplified 
by Banner (2013), who starts to move beyond strong versus weak evaluativism; 
instead defining disorder by the functionality of behavior. In accordance with the 
requirements of a satisfactory mental disorder concept implied by Muders (2014), we 
have here attempted to develop this functional view into a fully-fledged and coherent 
position within this debate that makes clear what norms are at issue and where they 
are seen to come from. 
Reconciling this functional view with science’s naturalized view of the 
universe required an account of how purposiveness and normativity can arise, in 
order for there to be purpose and norms against which functioning is contrasted. We 
argued that 3e cognition offers such an account which we have here explored, 
alongside consilient views of normativity, whereby norms arise in life-forms due to 
their organismic self-maintaining process structure and their adaption to the 
constraints of their environment (Christensen, 2012; Christensen & Bickhard, 2002; 
Okrent, 2017; Thompson, 2007). From this position, mental disorder is a pattern of 
behavior (inclusive of all actions of the organism, such as thought and perception) 
that runs counter to its functional norms to a significant or atypical degree (Nielsen 
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& Ward, 2018a). Functional norms are those norms that support the organisms 
continued self-maintenance and adaption, and by extension, their ability to fare well 
in their communities (Di Paolo, 2005; Maiese, 2016). What exactly it means to ‘fare 
well’ for any individual will subtly change as a function of the individual, and will co-
vary with the culture in which they learned to function. This welcomes intersection 
with cross-cultural psychology and psychiatry (Kirmayer & Crafa, 2014; Kirmayer & 
Ramstead, 2017).  
Teasing apart the norms that serve the individual from those that serve the 
group is a complicated exercise. We have here argued that this distinction must rest 
on whether the norms of society are working for the individual, or put more 
technically, whether the norms in question support the individual’s self-maintenance 
and adaption. A 3e orientation therefore prescribes strong consideration of context 
and culture over time, while also focusing on the individual and their needs. A 3e 
perspective on mental disorder, in that it subscribes to embedment, must recognize 
the role of culture in shaping the way that an individual functions. The functionality 
of a behavior, even those which we may dismiss as inherently pathological from a 
western context, is often contingent on the social environment, as well as the 
culturally informed manner of functioning and definition of ‘flourishing’ that the 
individual subscribes to. The 3e perspective encourages us to consider such rich 
variation and, through its basis in the organism’s strive to survive as a basic predicate 
of all life, provides a basis on which to begin to tease apart the disordered from the 
functional at the level of the individual. We have further specified that, within this 
framework, functional norms of individuals that are derived from non-functional or 
arbitrary socio-cultural norms should not play a role in demarcating disorder. 
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Despite their apparent functionality, such norms seem to represent a disorder of 
society rather than disorder of the individual.    
Understanding the normative nature of diagnosis is vital for the purposes of 
being able to ethically justify our practices as psychologists, psychiatrists, and 
councilors. We believe that a 3e conception holds potential in this regard given its 
ability to bridge the natural and the normative, and hope that our discussions here 
represent a step towards developing this perspective. Moving forward we intend to 
explore the implications of the framework presented here for the tasks of explanation 
and classification of psychopathology (Nielsen & Ward, 2018b). As an upshot of the 
normative focus that the 3e position brings, we must question the nature of the 
norms imposed by society. Institutions such as psychiatry and clinical psychology – 
in being the arbiters of such strong normative labels as diagnoses are, and advocates 
for those in or in need of our care – have a responsibility to be critical of the norms of 
society when they touch on our domain of expertise. Importantly, this includes 
reflecting on our own institutional and personal norms of practice. 
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